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We sought to compare the implicit and explicit views of a group of Muslim graduates on the fairness of Islamic 
law. In this preliminary investigation, we used the Electroencephalographic N400 Event Related Potential 
to detect the participant’s implicit beliefs. It was found that the majority of participants, eight out of ten, 
implicitly held that Islamic Law was unfair despite explicitly stating the opposite. In seeking to understand 
what separated these eight participants from the remaining two – the two who both implicitly and explicitly 
held that Islamic Law was fair – only two distinguishing characteristics could be identiied. Both participants 
had undertaken an in-depth study of a branch of Islamic law that places the spirit of the law above that of a 
literal interpretation. They had also attended the same seminary, exclusive to the other participants. Of the 
eight participants, it was discovered that, while they implicitly held Islamic law to be unfair, they also held it 
to be rational – in the same way they found that it was rational to push a person of a ship in order to save the 
remaining from drowning, yet unfair. We discuss these preliminary indings and consider theories on how an 
innate sense of fairness, an aspect of nativism, may come into play when it is not congruent with a participant’s 
own beliefs. Further, we ask, where such an inconsistency occurs, how does the mind attempt to rectify it – if 
at all? As a possible contribution to the discussion on theories of nativism vs. empiricism we put forward 
a hypothesis and methodology for investigation that may produce previously unconsidered data on human 
nature. 
Keywords
Law, EEG, N400, Islam, Maqasid, Implicit, Values
Introduction
Children oten question why things are the way they are. They also expect to be 
treated fairly amongst their peers. Such qualities, observed in infants from as young as 
six months, have spurred a theory that teleological reasoning and fairness are both innate 
(J. K. Hamlin 2015) (Deborah Kelemen and DiYanni 2005) challenging the empiricist 
notion that such qualities are learned. As infants progress through childhood and into 
adulthood, these qualities are seen to persist (Poling and Evans 2002) (Lombrozo, 
Kelemen, and Zaitchik 2007) (Deborah Kelemen, Rottman, and Seston 2013). It is such 
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that even with the most Machiavellian, seeing unfairness as justiied for the gain of 
power, such unfairness is never wished upon themselves. An innate aversion to unfairness 
appears to persist.
Here we pose a question: what occurs implicitly within the mind of an individual 
who subscribes to an authority that deines its own version of fairness and purpose? 
For example, an individual may subscribe to a political ideology that sets policy that it 
then deines as fair and of service to a civic purpose. These policies may oten be framed 
by the said authority as being beyond the rational grasp of the said individual and to 
be taken on trust despite any internal personal reservations. Another example may be 
that of a religious authority that deines its commands as fair and of purpose. Followers 
would be expected to accept such designations, even if they could not rationalise them. 
Thus, to consider how the mind of a person responds in this context, we sought to use 
the authority of ‘Islam’ deining its laws as ‘fair and of purpose.’ Using only Muslim 
participants for the study, the focus was on the authority of their religion deining the 
fairness and purpose of Islamic law. What their religion deemed to be fair and purposeful 
was to be accepted as fair and purposeful even if they could not rationalise such 
designations. 
In order to measure the implicit response of the human mind towards such 
designations that are set by the authority to which they subscribe, we measured the 
implicit attitude of the individuals under investigation. This is because naturally 
occurring implicit attitudes have been found to be a more accurate measure of attitude 
than direct measures such as survey items with summated rating scales (Graham et al. 
2012). Responses on direct measures such as surveys can represent conscious evaluations 
of content in memory rather than its activation (Gawronski, LeBel, and Peters 2007). 
Whereas many values, attitudes, and goals operate at implicit levels (Johnson and Saboe 
2011) (Bargh and Chartrand 1999) (Greenwald and Banaji 1995), and oten occur outside 
people’s awareness, intention, and control (Wittenbrink and Schwarz 2007) (Johnson and 
Saboe 2011). Furthermore, there is increasing evidence that much afective and cognitive 
regulation occur automatically (Kanfer 2009), and while justice researchers oten limit 
their attention to the explicit level, it is likely that justice has implicit efects because 
fairness-related experiences involve conditions of high arousal and strong afect (Tripp, 
Bies, and Aquino 2002) which increase the likelihood of implicit processing (Metcalfe and 
Mischel 1999) (Johnson and Saboe 2011).
Ordinarily, observant Muslims would explicitly respond that ‘Islamic law’ was fair. 
The source texts of the religion often remind of a critical importance of justice and 
rational purpose behind law. However, for this investigation, we were wholly unaware of 
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the implicit attitudes of Muslims in this area as no such study has as yet been undertaken, 
particularly not from the perspective of the cognition of law and religion. Discussions 
around fairness, purpose, and authority in approaching Islamic source texts have to date 
oten been based in philosophical and theological discourse with little perspective from 
the natural sciences. 
A new assessment on how particular approaches to understanding Islamic law 
manifest in the mind may lead to new perspectives on how the mind responds to 
commands that do not necessary align with one’s innate disposition. It may also help 
to inform how emerging Muslim majority counties in the world address this issue on a 
legal and constitutional level, particularly as fairness has been seen as a factor in bringing 
people together (Johnson and Lord 2010). 
Furthermore, while studies have documented how fairness judgments in general 
afect policy positions, there has been relatively little done on the genesis of the fairness 
judgments themselves. Lind has proposed that justice perceptions are pivotal cognitions 
because they prime motivations that give rise to speciic behaviors (2002, 67). Studies 
have also found substantial support for proposed links between the implicit efects of 
justice and self identity (Cropanzano et al. 2001).
Thus, detecting the attitudes of individuals towards law – with a commitment to a 
speciic authority – may shed some light on how determinations of fairness and purpose 
in law may be pre-set in some individuals even before they evaluate cases of law, as will 
be discussed.
To assess why participants may hold the implicit attitudes that are contrary to their 
explicit attitudes, we also collected information on their religious education background 
and how they normally approached legal problems such as the trolley problem using 
an anonymous questionnaire. Being unaware of the implicit responses of Muslim 
participants to questions on the fairness and purpose of Islamic law, this being the irst 
study of its kind as mentioned, we approached the study inductively. Then, using the 
data from the outcome, we formed two hypothesis for further study, one contingent on 
the implicit vs. explicit indings. 
To measure implicit attitudes, we would use the EEG N400 event related potential 
(ERP) method. The method allows us to discern if a person’s expressed explicit attitude is 
the same as their implicit attitude (Lind 2002) (Van Berkum et al. 2009) (Leuthold et al. 
2015). For example, a study (Van Berkum et al. 2009) asked two groups of participants 
to consider the statements: (a) “I think euthanasia is an acceptable course of action;” 
and, (b) “I think euthanasia is an unacceptable course of action.” For the twenty-one 
respondents the study describes as the strict Christian (SC) group, the authors compared 
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the Event Related Potential (ERP) responses to the value-inconsistent word ‘acceptable’ in 
the irst sentence with ERP responses to the value-consistent word ‘unacceptable’ in the 
second sentence. For the twenty-one respondents of the non-Christian (NC) group, they 
compared ERPs across the same statements. They found that value-inconsistent sentences 
increased the amplitude of the N400 component (Van Berkum et al. 2009) a inding also 
observed in a study that examined the N400 for value-inconsistent sentences (Leuthold 
et al. 2015). The N400 response is a broad negative signal that appears around 400ms 
ater the test word has been presented aurally or visually (Lau, Phillips, and Poeppel 
2008). The system used has been further investigated by Wiswede who found the N400 
marker can only be obtained when a participant uses an evaluative mindset (Wiswede 
et al. 2013). Thus, for this study we measured the ERP of Muslim participants when they 
considered the sentences ‘I believe Islamic law is fair/unfair.’
Materials and Methods
Participants
Ethical approval from the University of Cambridge Psychology Research Ethics 
Committee was obtained for the study. As the study required the participation of 
committed and practicing Muslims, we advertised in the local Muslim Society and at two 
mosques in the Cambridge area. We also used social media and word of mouth. Those 
that registered their interest by emailing were sent a Participant Information Form and a 
Consent Form to consider before committing. Of the thirty-eight people who expressed 
interest, twenty-two registered and took part. Five were female and seventeen male. The 
age range was between twenty and twenty-nine, except one participant who was sixty-
ive. Due to artifacts, complete data from only ten participants, 9 male and 1 female, all 
between twenty and twenty-nine years of age, were usable in this study.
Stimuli
The sotware BCI2000 was used to present the sentences and record the EEG with 
accurate time-locking to the stimulus presentation. The choice of this sotware was due to 
exact time labeling of each stimulus cue on the EEG data, thus allowing for time locking 
and stimulus word identiication during analysis without the concern of possible latency 
errors in labeling the EEG that may arise due to time delays when passing through long 
cables.
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We presented the participants with sentences on a computer screen. The two test 
sentences were: ‘I believe Islamic law is fair.’ and ‘I believe Islamic law is not fair.’ Both 
were presented for counterbalancing. If the participant’s implicit response to the irst 
sentence was that they agreed, it was expected that the participant’s implicit response to 
the second sentence would be that they disagreed. 
These sentences were presented within a longer list of sentences that are not part of 
the study, but allowed for a distraction to avoid the participant anticipating the theme of 
the sentences. We also included a third test sentence ‘Sharia is not irrational,’ Sharia being 
a wider term for Islamic Law.
Control sentences acted as standards for the study. Four control sentences were 
presented to the participants:
• Malcolm X was a Prophet
• 7 + 1 = 4
• A car has four wheels
• Mohammed was a Prophet
The irst two control sentences were designed to be considered implicitly false by the 
participants, and the second two control sentences were designed to be considered 
implicitly true by the participants. The implicit responses to the control sentences were 
stored.
The implicit responses to a test sentence (e.g., ‘I believe Islamic law is fair’) could 
then be compared against the stored implicit responses elicited by the two controls. This 
allowed us to determine if the implicit response elicited by a test sentence belonged to 
the category of a ‘true’ or ‘false’ implicit control sentence response, as discussed in the 
Data Analysis section below. 
All sentences were presented one word at a time. Each word appeared on a new 
slide. The slides had a black background, and used white text for contrast. To prepare 
the slides, JPEG images of each word were made. For each sentence, a blank black slide 
was inserted between each word to pace the participants equally, and to provide enough 
time for any impulse under 500ms to have dissipated. Each slide was visible for 500ms. 
The sentences were structured such that the inal word in each sentence was the one that 
would elicit the implicit response. This response would depend on the reader’s implicit 
attitude. Thus it was only the last word that was expected to generate an N400.
At the end of each sentence, where the N400 was due to be measured, two blank 
screens were presented to allow for enough time for the signal to be generated. The 
next slide displayed a question mark. Upon seeing the question mark, a participant, who 
would be sitting with their arms on the desk, would indicate their answer by tapping 
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the desk once for ‘agree,’ twice for ‘disagree’ and three times for ‘unsure’ – this would be 
their ‘explicit response.’ The act of tapping was found to elicit less interference to the EEG 
trace than asking them to verbally express their answer. A blank screen then separated 
the previous sentence from the next. Subjects sat facing a computer screen approximately 
70 cm away in a noise-attenuated room to minimise distractions. The sentences were 
presented in the same order to the participants and were presented once. All participants 
were exposed to the same sentences. 
The study was organized as part of an unpublished graduated MPhil dissertation 
at the University of Cambridge in a collaboration between the Faculty of Divinity and 
Department of Clinical Neurosciences. 
Data Collection
The EEG of each participant was recorded using a g.tec USBamp (24-bit 16-channel 
biosignal amplifier, g.tec Medical Engineering GmbH, Austria. Serial Number UA-
2007.04.24) at a sampling frequency of 256 Hz. The ground electrode was located on the 
right mastoid. The reference was selected as the electrode at AFz. Passive gold electrodes 
were placed on an EEG cap at sixteen recording sites distributed over central and parietal 
areas where the N400 is known to be maximal (FCz, Fz, F3, F4, Cz, C1, C2, C3, C4, Pz, 
P3, P4, O1,O2, PO3 and PO4). SuperVisc High Viscosity Electrolyte Gel (EasyCap GmbH, 
Germany) was used to improve conductivity between the scalp and the electrodes. The 
impedance values were kept under 25kOhm, and were typically 10k Ohms.
Data Analysis
The original reference was maintained. The EEG recorded was iltered using a digital 
FIR ilter between 0.5Hz and 20Hz. This frequency range captured the N400 ERP. Periods 
with ocular artifacts in the EEG recordings were removed by visual inspection. The data 
were segmented into 1000-msec EEG epochs, starting 200-msec before the precise time 
of onset of the target word (the last word in each sentence) and ending 800-msec ater 
the onset. The epochs were baseline corrected, using the average of the 200-msec pre-
stimulus period. 
The control sentence implicit response ERPs were averaged. A time window that 
provided the greatest distinction between the averaged ‘false’ control implicit responses 
of all the participants and that of averaged ‘true’ control implicit responses of all the 
participants was found. This was between the data points of 409ms – 503ms, on C2 
(t-test 2.12, p=0.003). This provided for two control groups, an implicitly ‘true’ control 
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response, and its opposite, an implicitly ‘false’ control response. The EEGLAB toolbox for 
MATLAB (Delorme and Makeig 2004) was used for these analyses.
In order to be able to systematically categorise the implicit response of a participant 
to a test sentence (e.g., ‘I believe Islamic law is fair’) as being implicitly true or implicitly 
false, the implicit test sentence response was compared with implicit responses obtained 
from control sentences. This comparison was carried out as follows.
To determine which of the two control groups (‘true’ or ‘false’) an implicit response 
elicited by a test sentence belonged to, we employed a statistical comparison. We 
compared the implicit response elicited by a test sentence against the two control groups 
using a two-sample t-test. In order to determine if the implicit response elicited by a 
test sentence was the same or diferent to either of the two controls, we considered 
the p value that resulted when the t-test was conducted on the test sentence implicit 
response data points and each control implicit response data points. The t-test being 
made separately for each of the two controls against the implicit response elicited by 
a test sentence. We found that, for all results, the implicit response elicited by a test 
sentence could be attributed as being the same as either one of the two controls. The 
outcome of the t-test for each test sentence was a p < 0.05 for exclusively one of the two 
controls. Never were the data points elicited from a test sentence statistically the same as 
both controls. Each implicit response elicited by a test sentence could thus be categorised 
as belonging exclusively to either one of the two implicit control groups to a p < 0.05. 
With all the test sentences now categorized as either implicitly true or implicitly 




All twenty two participants were presented the four control sentences. To view the 
data from these, we present the full data set graph plot in Figures 1 & 2.
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Figure 1. Average of all ERP signals from participants when they read 
the ‘true’ controls - sentences that they implicitly agreed with. The 
N400 wave is minimal (seen between 400ms to 500ms). Epoch from 
time (t) = -200ms to 800ms – whereby the inal word of the control 
(stimulus onset) occurs at time (t) = 0ms. Each trace represents a 
channel. 
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Figure 2. Average of all ERP signals from participants when reading 
‘false’ controls - sentences they were implicitly disagreed with. The 
N400 wave is maximal (seen as the dip between 400ms to 500ms). 
Epoch from time (t) = -200ms to 800ms – whereby the inal word of 
the control (stimulus onset) occurs at time (t) = 0.
Figure 1 depicts the responses to ‘true’ controls, and figure 2 depicts the ‘false’ 
control responses. 
The results from asking participants whether they agreed or disagreed with the 
sentence ‘I believe Islamic law is fair’ is presented next. To visualize these outcomes, we 
present below the explicit response given by the participants, the implicit categorisation, 
the averaged implicit score (the ERP averaged over the 409ms – 503ms time window), 
and whether the implicit result was consistent with their explicit response.







‘I believe Islamic law is fair’
Participant’s Implicit 
Response to:
 ‘I believe Islamic law is fair’
Participant’s avg. Implicit 
score (µV) to:
 ‘I believe Islamic law is fair’
Comparison of Explicit and 
Implicit result
1 True False -2.9778 Inconsistent 
2 True True 0.3508 Consistent 
3 True False -1.0719 Inconsistent 
4 True False -5.1088 Inconsistent 
5 True False -7.4296 Inconsistent 
6 True False -57.5302 Inconsistent 
7 True False -4.5338 Inconsistent 
8 True True 1.3363 Consistent 
9 True False -41.005 Inconsistent 
10 True False -7.0499 Inconsistent 
Table 1. Explicit and implicit responses of all participants to the test 
sentence ‘I believe Islamic law is fair.’






‘I believe Islamic law is unfair’
Participant’s Implicit 
Response to:
 ‘I believe Islamic law is 
unfair’
Participant’s avg. Implicit 
score (µV) to:
 ‘I believe Islamic law is 
unfair’
Comparison of Explicit and 
Implicit result
1 False True 9.8057 Inconsistent
2 False False 0.8198 Consistent
3 False True 1.1513 Inconsistent
4 False True 0.7443 Inconsistent
5 False True 2.0114 Inconsistent
6 False False -8.119 Consistent
7 False False -0.2034 Consistent
8 False False -4.658 Consistent
9 False False -3.7474 Consistent
10 False False -0.2928 Consistent
Table 2. Explicit and Implicit responses of all participants to the test 
sentence ‘I believe Islamic law is unfair.’
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The first result to appear in this determination was that, while all participants 
explicitly indicated that they agreed with the statement ‘Islamic law is fair,’ eight 
participants appeared to disagree implicitly. The two other participants displayed no 
inconsistency in their results. They explicitly and implicitly believed Islamic law was fair. 
They were participants 2 and 8. From their questionnaires, they both had attended the 
same seminary, both believed all areas of religion are meant to be reasonable and both 
also expressed that there were higher objectives behind Islamic law, both had undertaken 
an in-depth study of Maqasid (Higher objectives of Islamic law, which is also known as 
the spirit of the law approach). Both participants 2 and 8 were Maturidi Sunnis. They 
also both said ‘yes’ to the question ‘Do you believe what is ‘good’ and ‘bad’ is naturally 
known to humankind?’ though they disagreed on: ‘If humans never had prophets, could 
they live fairly and prosperously?’ Participant 2 answered ‘yes.’ Both were male and of 
age 20. Both expressed that ‘Right and wrong can depend on the situation.’ These two 
participants contrasted with the other participants in the following way: 
These two participants, who were consistent -believing Islamic law was fair both 
implicitly and explicitly, difered with the remaining inconsistent participants in one 
educational area: The two consistent participants had undertaken an in-depth academic 
study of the higher objectives of Islamic law (Maqasid) also known as the spirit of the 
law approach, as mentioned. An approach that considers fairness and purpose as essential 
parts of law and law making (Auda 2008, 3, 4, 16, 34, 49).
In considering the responses of all participants to the statement, ‘I believe Islamic 
law is fair’ and ‘I believe Islamic law is unfair,’ we expected that the implicit results of 
the participants would show that they implicitly agreed with one but not the other. 
This was the case for participants 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 8. These may be considered correctly 
counterbalanced. This was expected, as an implicit response to one sentence should be 
the opposite of the other. However four other participants – 6, 7, 9, 10 appeared not to 
provide counterbalanced results. We consider these next.
For three of those four participants: participant 7, 9 and 10, we note that their 
implicit responses may be considered counterbalanced if we were considering a 
comparison of the relative magnitude values for the two opposite sentences. All implicit 
responses to the irst sentence using ‘fair’ are many orders of magnitude larger than 
its opposite sentence ‘unfair.’ To visualize this we present the magnitude ratios below 
in table 3. The level of the N400 for the test sentence: ‘Islamic law is unfair’ is many 
orders smaller than the N400 for the opposite sentence. This indicates an aversion to 
the ‘fair’ claim that is many times more substantial than that to the ‘unfair’ claim. This 
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may indicate that they implicitly disagreed with the sentence ‘I believe Islamic law is 
fair’ to a far higher degree than its opposite. With Participant 6 however, given the high 
negativity for both sentences, despite being opposite sentences, we may consider that 
their response may be that of an outlier. Further studies on whether the N400 can be 
used as a scale of ‘agreement’ would be beneicial for the larger study to come - as will be 
outlined at the end of this paper.
Participant Magnitude ratio of the avg. Implicit results to both sentences: (Unfair/
Fair)
Participant 7 0.203/4.534= 0.04%
Participant 9 3.747/41.01 = 0.09%
Participant 10 0.293/7.05= 0.04%
Participant 6 8.119/57.5302 = 14.1% (outlier)
Table 3. Relative average responses to the two sentences ‘I believe 
Islamic law is unfair / fair.’
The second result of this study found that all participants held the implicit belief that 
Islamic law was unfair despite explicitly stating the opposite, except for two participants, 
participants 2 and 8. These two participants believed Islamic law was fair at both an 
implicit and explicit level. 
Before discussing the reasons for this inconsistency in the implicit and explicitly 
expressed outcome, we consider the outcome of presenting the sentence ‘Sharia can 
never be irrational.’ 
Third Test Sentence Results
Instead of using the term ‘Islamic law,’ we used the term ‘Sharia,’ Sharia being a 
wider term used to describe Islamic law. We replaced ‘fair/unfair’ by the term ‘irrational.’ 
Thus the test sentence became: ‘Sharia can never be irrational.’ For visualization, the test 
responses are given in table 3.
         










‘Sharia can never be 
irrational’
Participant’s avg. Implicit 
score (µV) to:
‘Sharia can never be 
irrational’
Comparison of Explicit and 
Implicit result
1 False True 7.2174 Inconsistent 
2 False True 1.526 Inconsistent 
3 False True 2.2694 Inconsistent 
4 False True 8.2501 Inconsistent 
5 False False -0.0433 Consistent 
6 False False -7.7214 Consistent 
7 Unsure False -18.3416 Unknown
8 False False -1.6594 Consistent 
9 False False -38.1368 Consistent 
10 True False -0.4617 Inconsistent 
Table 4. Explicit and implicit responses of all participants to the test 
sentence ‘Sharia can never be irrational.’ 
All of the participants explicitly expressed disagreement with the sentence ‘Sharia 
can never be irrational’ through tapping except for one participant (participant 10), 
one other remained unsure (participant 7). However, of the participants who expressed 
explicit disagreement, four of them implicitly agreed with that sentence: Participants 1, 
2, 3 and 4. That is, they implicitly held that Sharia can never be irrational (i.e., Sharia is 
always rational). Three of these participants (1, 3, 4) also implicitly held that Islamic law 
was unfair (table 1). 
Here we pose the question: ‘why was it that they implicitly held Sharia can never be 
irrational, yet also implicitly held that Islamic law can be unfair?’ To answer this question 
we considered the questionnaire responses to see how the participants reasoned on 
questions such as the trolley problem (deontological, utilitarian, etc.) and it was found 
that participants 1, 3 and 4 had taken the view that it was rational to push one person 
of a ship that was sinking due to being used over its capacity in order to save the other 
passengers. This outcome may indicate that the participants (1, 3 and 4) thus held that 
Sharia is, form a consequentialist point of view, rational yet unfair. 
A main inding thus appears to be that these three participants considered ‘what is 
rational can be distinct to being fair.’ It would seem to indicate that in their reasoning, 
laws that can be rationalised may not necessarily be fair. Such a view, the unfairness 
yet rationality of Islamic law, would be considered at odds with Islamic legal thought, 
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however, it appears that it was implicitly held by these participants. This being the case, it 
may highlight how individuals may hold implicit values that they themselves are unaware 
of, values that are at odds with their own explicitly expressed value system. This is not 
an uncommon inding as the Implicit Association Test, a psychological test method that 
uses timing to compare the strength of association, has shown that many individuals 
hold biases towards races and other social categories that they themselves were not 
consciously aware of (Nosek, Banaji, and Greenwald 2002).
We consider next why it was the case that a number of the participants (eight) 
exhibited an inconsistency between their implicit and explicit results. This inconsistency 
may be considered a form of cognitive dissonance as we shall explore. Further we will 
consider why these implicit responses may have materialised to begin with.
Discussion
Why the dissonance between implicit and explicit responses?
Cognitive dissonance is a negative drive state that occurs whenever an individual 
simultaneously holds two cognitions, be they ideas, beliefs, or opinions, which are 
psychologically inconsistent, whereby the opposite of one cognition follows from the 
other (Berkowitz 1978, 2). When an implicit response is found to be diferent to an 
explicit response, this may be an indication of cognitive dissonance. 
For a Muslim to explicitly suggest that Islamic law is unfair, they could potentially 
be distancing themselves from their own group. This being too averse a step to take due 
to group social and emotional attachment, dissonance may result. An alternate reason 
for the indication of dissonance may be rooted in the inding that there is a tendency 
to justify the current wider social order even if the status quo goes against one’s 
personal interests (Jost, Banaji, and Nosek 2004). A common inding in the literature 
on system justiication is that members of disadvantaged groups oten adopt a negative 
stereotypical view of their ingroup, thereby protecting their beliefs about the fairness 
of the current wider social structure. From a cognitive consistency perspective, one 
may consider that such reactions have their roots in the conlict between the general 
belief that the existing social structure is fair and the speciic belief that one’s ingroup 
is disadvantaged. To the extent that individuals are motivated to retain their general 
belief about the fairness of the current system, they may restore consistency by adopting 
the belief that the ingroup is inferior (Gawronski 2012). This may also be a factor that 
helps to explain why some who identify with religious establishments that ought to 
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champion fairness, have in the past lent support to authoritarian regimes and unjust 
social structures instead of lending support to the ingroup that is being treated unfairly. 
In addition, it may be that identifying Islamic law as unfair would be the same as 
suggesting that the ‘way of life’ of the Muslim community in which they lived was at 
fault. Protecting their beliefs about the fairness of the current Muslim social structure 
may have thus also led to the dissonance indicated by the study.
An alternative reason for the indication of dissonance may be as suggested by studies 
that consider cognitive dissonance to be in part due to ‘ego-defense.’ Consistency as a 
core motive for dissonance has been documented in cases related to mechanisms of ego-
defense in justice settings (Konow 2000). It may be that maintaining one’s view to be 
correct could have caused such dissonance. 
Yet, despite these theories on possible causes of cognitive dissonance, 
neuropsychological work has demonstrated that dissonance in general might not always 
be a conscious strategic process (Lieberman et al. 2001). Anterograde amnesia patients, 
who had neurological damage afecting the functioning of medial temporal lobe and 
were incapable of forming new memories, were compared with healthy controls on a 
dissonance task. The amnesics had no memory of having performed a behavior that 
conlicted with their previously established attitudes and thus were not likely to have 
engaged in conscious strategic attitude change. Nonetheless, the amnesics changed their 
attitudes to the same extent as controls. These results suggest that, rather than conscious 
rationalisation, cognitive dissonance reduction may sometimes depend on implicit 
constraint satisfaction processes (Read, Vanman, and Miller 1997; Lieberman 2006).
Decisions emanating from implicit-explicit cognitive dissonance
Since the occurrence of dissonance is presumed to be unpleasant, individuals strive 
to reduce it by adding ‘constant’ cognitions or by changing one or both cognitions to 
make them ‘it together’ (Berkowitz 1978). One of the ways cognitive dissonance is 
alleviated, is through rationalisation. Cognitive dissonance theory proposes that the agent 
is motivated to reduce this tension and may, in this context, do so either by reducing self-
interested behavior, or by engaging in self-deception, or by some combination of the 
two. It is documented as a ‘psychological’ need (Festinger 1962). It is also seen in children 
when they seek a form of cognitive consistency (Egan, Santos, and Bloom 2007). 
In such circumstances, when individuals perform a behavior or make a choice that 
conflicts with a previously established attitude, the attitude tends to change in the 
direction that resolves the conlict with the behavior. This process appears to involve a 
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rationalisation whereby individuals strategically change their attitudes in order to avoid 
appearing inconsistent (Jarcho, Berkman, and Lieberman 2011). Of the eight participants 
who displayed an indication of cognitive dissonance, believing Islamic law to be unfair at 
an implicit level, three appear to have rationalised their position on this. The study found 
that the three of the eight had held at an implicit level that ‘Sharia was not irrational.’ 
Thus, it appears that they had found a method to accept Islamic law as being a valid and 
true system of law by rationalising it’s perceived unfairness. They did so by ascribing 
to a form of utilitarianism. To them, it was unfair to push a person of a boat to save 
the remaining passengers, yet it was the rational course of action. In the same way, it 
appears, they may have found Islamic law, or elements of it to be unfair, yet justiied this 
by considering such framing as a rational and not irrational position to take on law. 
Why did a conlicting implicit attitude manifest?
Irrespective of the method by which participants came to express a view that was 
contrary to their implicit attitude, there remains a further question. Why did eight of the 
participants have an implicit attitude that was at odds with Islam, the ‘authority’ that 
they believed in? 
It may be argued from an empiricist perspective, one that holds ‘values’ as learned, 
that a ‘value system’ of any authority that is subscribed to and practiced would not cause 
any cognitive dissonance. This would be because the subscriber has submitted themselves 
to the worldview set by the authority. The values of the person are shaped by the said 
authority. Such was the case with the participants of this study. This was displayed in 
their anonymized conidential feedback questionnaire, none of the participants expressed 
they believed in an alternative worldview. Yet, for eight of the participants, the majority 
– seven of whom were seminary graduates and involved in religious teaching – it appears 
there was a factor that perturbed this attitude, one which may have led the mind to a 
form of cognitive dissonance. Given that – we suggest – it was not an alternate system 
of beliefs, it may be that the factor that caused this perturbation was actually an innate 
sense of both fairness and purpose. For without such an innate sense, where else may 
they have a point of reference that contradicted their system of belief? This hypothesis 
is also made based on additional information found in this research: The consistency of 
the implicit and explicit result found with the two participants who subscribed to the 
Maqasid legal school of law. The school places a determination of fairness and purpose as 
recourses that are essential to law (Auda 2008, 3–4, 32). We expand on this further, next. 
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In among the participants were two who had undertaken an in-depth academic 
study of school of Maqasid, also known as the spirit of law school. The school places 
authority in the concepts of fairness and purpose, instead of relying on a literal reading of 
the source texts (Auda 2008, 3–4,32; Ashur 2006). This allows a jurist to change textually 
mandated laws when a context changes. A law that is fair in one context may not be 
fair in another, in part because the purpose of the law is no longer met. Consideration 
of the fairness and purpose of law is central to this school. Law is not seen as dogmatic 
or irrational, but open to reason. The law’s main intentions are seen to revolve around 
protecting and upholding people’s interests, the acquisition of beneit, and mitigation of 
harm. Early legal scholars such as al-Shatibi articulated these in ive main objectives, the 
protection of life, religion, progeny, wealth, and intellect. These objectives collectively 
represented the telos to which reasoned deliberation in the law must aim (Emon 2010, 
116). 
This epistemology of law allows for recourse to fairness and purpose, compared 
to non-Maqasid schools which rely solely on the text, its authority, in a more literalist 
approach to law (Jackson 2006). Thus, it may be the case that the Maqasid school allowed 
a participant’s attitude towards law not to clash with their innate human expectation 
that law needed to be both fair and of purpose. The school may have allowed for a 
human expectation of fairness and purpose in law to remain unfettered and to implicitly 
manifest.
Furthermore, the two participants were of the Maturidi theological school that takes 
a nativist approach to morality, suggesting that good and bad can be recognised without 
recourse to source texts. However, other participants also adhered to this theological 
school. It may thus be put forward that, without recourse to a legal mechanism (i.e., 
Maqasid) that considered fairness and purpose as essential to law and law making, a 
clash with an innate, nativist expectation occurred. The Maqasid legal school holds a 
practical methodology. Thus, it appears that in taking a Maturidi stance in theology 
without a Maqasid practical stance on law, an innate sense of fairness and purpose could 
not ind a practical method to express itself, resulting in cognitive dissonance. 
In the case of those participants who did not subscribe to the Maqasid school, and 
thus efectively subscribed to more literal approaches, placing far more authority in the 
text, studies have found that such authority lends itself to a form of legal formalism, 
one where the law appears to the person holding this schema as complete and univocal 
(Lyons 1998, 258). It has also been found that those holding such attitudes, whereby 
law is seen as unchanging, exaggerate the role of the text and minimize the role of the 
human agent who interprets it (Fadl 2009, 98). The more literalist the approach to law 
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is, the less the concern with its consequences – so far as the wording has been enacted 
irrespective of its context.
In essence, what the overall indings may thus be suggesting, is that ‘there are innate 
qualiications of fairness and purpose’ and that these ‘continue to persist at an implicit 
level despite an individual’s subscription to an alternative set of values.’ 
What may be put to challenge this thesis is that, despite the majority’s commitment, 
practice and seminary learning, the negative implicit results were not due to a clash with 
an innate sense of fairness and purpose, but were due to a clash with a unconscious 
learned value system that they unconsciously subscribed to. One that they were not fully 
aware of. One that considered Islamic law to be unfair and without tangible purpose. 
However, such would need to be substantiated with the results of the participant’s 
belief on this topic, and the current study found that all the participants believed in the 
prophethood of Muhammed and truth of his message. 
An alternative challenge may be that a person’s own ego could be a cause for 
cognitive dissonance. Hence, it may be that a subject’s own egotistic aversion to act fairly 
alters their implicit response towards such a question as ‘I believe Islamic law is fair.’ If this 
could be indeed established, then an additional or alternative hypothesis for the results 
may be that ‘the state of a subject’s ego will relect in their implicit data’ – whereby the 
eight who had negative implicit results had not ‘suiciently controlled their ego’ to be 
at ease with the concept of acting fairly, compared to the two who had ‘controlled their 
ego’ suiciently to be content with acting fairly. While Islam and it’s Sui dimension has 
within its approach a method to assist an individual to overcome their ego, one that 
would have an efect on character, the challenge with this theory is that, as it currently 
stands, the N400 ERP has demonstrated itself as a method by which it establishes core 
knowledge and belief violations as detailed above, and not the detection of the factor – 
be it confounding – of a person’s own ego.
Innate qualiications of law?
Two elements that make up law are undoubtedly fairness and purpose. Whether 
human beings are naturally good, bad, or neither, has been a starting point upon which 
legal philosophers have built their theories, particularly those which relate to social 
contracts.
In developmental cognition terms on teleological reasoning, an attempt to reduce 
children’s broad teleological bias was carried out in a study that attempted to introduce 
a pre-trial that described, in non-teleological terms, the physical process by which non-
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living natural kinds form. In spite of this attempt, the study replicated the efects of 
an earlier study in which no pre-trial information was given as to the reasons behind 
these physical processes (D. Kelemen 1999). It has also been found that young children 
are prone to generating artifact-like teleo-functional explanations of living and nonliving 
natural entities and endorsing intelligent design as the source of animals and artifacts 
(Deborah Kelemen and DiYanni 2005). The same study also revealed that children’s teleo-
functional and intelligent design intuitions about natural phenomena are interconnected. 
Indeed the authors opined that children’s teleo-functional intuitions might relect an 
indefeasible, innate, cognitive bias. This tendency becomes more selective as children 
acquire increasingly coherent beliefs about causal mechanisms (Lombrozo, Kelemen, and 
Zaitchik 2007). Teleological reasoning has also been shown with one-year old’s (Gergely 
and Csibra 1997). At around ten to twelve years of age, the preference for teleological 
explanations lessens (Cruz and Smedt 2015). Yet a preference for teleology persists 
throughout life, with a distinct developmental continuity observable of a preference 
for teleological explanations (Lombrozo, Kelemen, and Zaitchik 2007) leading some to 
put forward the view that teleological reasoning may be innate (Deborah Kelemen and 
DiYanni 2005).
On fairness, capuchin monkeys have demonstrated a strong aversion to its absence in 
food share amongst its peers (Brosnan and de Waal 2003) (Lakshminaryanan, Chen, and 
Santos 2008). In humans, Hamlin has shown an expectation of fairness and an version 
to unfair behavior in 6 and 16 month old babies (J. K. Hamlin 2015). They contend that 
although active prosocial behaviors emerge ater birth, they are unlikely wholly the result 
of brute socialization: They ind that they occur spontaneously, are present in primates, 
and are intrinsically motivated (Aknin, Hamlin, and Dunn 2012). By the end of a child’s 
irst year, infants categorize goal-helping as positive and goal-hindering as negative. Like 
adults, infants appear to evaluate others as good and bad mentalistically: ‘Good guys are 
those who knowingly and intentionally facilitate a third party’s goal’ (Kiley Hamlin et al. 
2013). 
The expectation of fairness in infants also appears to be projected onto others. 
Infants have been shown to expect that individuals, treated fairly and unfairly in a 
resource distribution task, would prefer the fair distributor (Geraci and Surian 2011). 
Infants from as early 3 and 4.5 months of age have an aversion to hinderers over helpers 
(Kiley Hamlin, Wynn, and Bloom 2010; J. Kiley Hamlin 2013). Hamilin thus concluded 
that from extremely early in life, human infants show morally relevant motivations and 
evaluations — ones that are mentalistic, nuanced, and do not appear to stem from 
socialization or morally speciic experience.
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Amazonian Ultimatum Games and the universality of fairness in humans?
It also appears that the characteristic of fairness is universal (Brosnan and de 
Waal 2003). Moral judgements activate brain regions that are involved in mentalising, 
including the medial frontal cortex. A study that compared patients who sufered lesions 
in this region at a young age and those whose cortex was damaged in adulthood found 
patients with childhood lesions presented with defective social and moral reasoning, 
whereas this was not evident in those with later damage (Anderson et al. 1999).
To investigate the possible variations on how resources are shared from culture 
to culture, a study found that a tribe in the Amazon made do with smaller shares in 
ultimatum games (Henrich 2000), which they suggest may demonstrate that the 
qualiication of fairness is diferent from culture to culture. This was repeated in iteen 
diferent societies with similar variation in the amount of money ofered in the Ultimatum 
Game (Henrich et al. 2001). Yet, these studies regrettably did not ask the question 
‘would the individuals taking the larger share and ofering the lower share have wished 
the same for themselves?’ It seems the study missed a critical factor in it’s consideration 
of the outcome. Consideration of how others are similar to oneself is of prime importance 
in hypothesizing the outcome of these games. This has been demonstrated in more 
recent social cognitive neuroscience research that involve economic exchange with social 
dynamics. These studies use paradigms such as the Ultimatum Game (Sanfey et al. 2003) 
to examine the neural responses associated with cooperation, competition, fairness, 
and trust. Across these studies, cooperation, trust, and fair play typically activate the 
VMPFC, MPFC, and MPAC (Decety et al. 2004; McCabe et al. 2001), whereas unfair 
and untrustworthy responses activate insula (Sanfey et al. 2003), caudate in the basal 
ganglia (de Quervain et al. 2004), or DMPFC (Decety et al. 2004). The inding that 
cooperation, relative to competition, promotes MPFC rather than DMPFC activity, is also 
consistent with previously described work (Mitchell, Banaji, and Macrae 2005) such that 
cooperation may be associated with seeing the other players as more similar to oneself, 
since cooperation, relative to competition, promotes MPFC rather than DMPFC activity 
(Lieberman 2006). 
This is consistent with our stipulation that a study on fairness in ultimatum games 
ought to pose the question ‘does the player wish the same share for themselves.’ 
Considered symmetrically: If the opposite player were themselves, would they ofer 
the same share? Such a question would allow us to assess whether or not the player 
views the other person as similar to themselves, in which case, the above social cognitive 
neuroscience research appears to suggest that the player would more likely be fair to 
them.
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Across these studies on fairness and trust, the fairness of the decision-making process 
has oten been confounded with the material value of the outcome. That is, fair responses 
from a partner are typically associated with better inancial outcomes for the subject. 
Tabibnia recently manipulated the material payofs and the fairness of the partner’s 
behavior independently. Ater controlling for material payofs, fairness still activated an 
array of motivation- and reward-related regions, including the VMPFC, ventral striatum 
in the basal ganglia, and amygdala, which suggests that fairness is hedonically valued in 
social interactions (Lieberman 2006). 
We also suggest that asymmetrical relations can belie a self-centered cognition. Thus, 
exploitation ought to be considered as a behavioral factor to be measured in ultimatum 
type studies, particularly when a society is scarce of resource and individuals can oten 
‘make do’ with that they receive. The knowledge of this circumstance can spur a person 
in power to take advantage of the situation and ofer less than they would outside of 
this context.
Context: Law, morality and cognition
Within early Muslim jurisprudence, two approaches to law existed. One was 
based on source texts, whereby the source texts deined justice, compassion, beneit 
and harm. The enterprise took to an empiricist type of approach towards morality. The 
second school of law saw in the source texts representations of justice, compassion, the 
acquisition of beneit and mitigation of harm. This form of reasoning also manifested 
itself in a speciic method for arriving at law, a method that became known as istihsan 
(juristic preference). It was driven by reasonableness, fairness, common sense and public 
interest set as deriving the most good and mitigating the most harm, both of which 
involved reasoning that did not appear to be directly based on the source texts (Izzidien 
In Press; Hallaq 2005, 116). Maqasid began to be developed as a bridge between the two 
approaches to law (Izzidien In Press). The theological stance of the Maturidis, Atharis 
and Mutazilites allowed for a rationalisation of law that set it’s purpose as being the 
beneit of humankind, set in fairness – not one based in dogma and literalism. In the 
current twenty-irst century, Muslim Democrats have taken to Maqasid, seeing it as an 
authentic means for the re-interpretation of law to allow it to remain dynamic and suited 
to new contexts (Glancy 2007, 35). Some recent reformers have, it has been suggested, 
attempted to use Maqasid as a means beyond what it was intended for (Emon 2010, 
188). How law is articulated today in many countries in the Muslim World have their 
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roots in these early discussions found in Islamic legal theory. These discussions continue 
today in similar lines to those on legal formalism and realism. 
Follow up studies – two new hypotheses. 
With the inductive part of the study complete, we are now able to set two new 
hypotheses to be examined. 
The first hypothesis would be ‘Ascribing to the spirit of law school of thought 
(Maqasid) exclusively produces an implicit belief that Islamic law is fair.’ To test this 
hypothesis we would need to recruit two larger groups of participants, one that ascribes 
to this school and a second that speciically does not. Larger groups will allow the study 
to be more representative. It may also be useful to consider, in a third study, whether the 
implicit views of the latter school could be changed – if any of them were to want to 
reconsider their views ater the study.
The second hypothesis would be on the ‘nativism and empiricism’ area of study in 
this paper. While most studies on this revolve around developmental cognition, given 
that babies and infants have yet to be ‘socialised’ into taking up a set of values, providing 
ideal for research into such studies, we propose an alternative method usable in adults. 
Given the empiricist approach holds that values held are always learned, we would 
seek to ind adults who subscribe to a named value system (or authority), implicitly 
and explicitly, be it religious or non-religious. Of these adults we would attempt to 
detect any discrepancy between their expressed views and implicit views on the values 
associated with that named value system (or authority) (e.g., it’s fairness). Where such 
a dissonance occurs we would seek to decide if such a dissonance could be related to an 
innate factor or to an alternate socialised learned factor using implicit values measures. 
The study would ask if it is indeed possible for an adult to hold implicit values that 
contradict nativist theories on innate values. These methods could naturally be extended 
to other forms of concepts. The measurement of implicit responses to a wide array of 
values would be necessary in order to remove confounding factors. 
This study may be further extended to the study of law in general and that of 
judgments made by judges who subscribe to an ideology, as their judgments may also 
be unconsciously biased. This has been found in research on bias, political ideological 
subscription and court case outcomes in non-implicit data research on the topic (Sunstein 
et al. 2007).
Further, fMRI data on moral decisions has shown that moral problems given their 
personal dimension, activated a medial frontoparietal network along with LPAC to a 
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greater degree than an impersonal condition, consistent with notion that a personal 
condition promotes self reflection on the implications of one’s contribution to the 
outcome. Whereas an impersonal condition, in contrast, leads to greater activity in lateral 
frontoparietal regions than does the personal condition, consistent with an external 
focus on events in the world (Greene et al. 2001) (Mendez, Anderson, and Shapira 
2005) (Lieberman 2006). It may thus be useful to investigate how individuals with the 
indications of dissonance found in this study, those who rationalised their moral decision 
to push a person of a ship to save the others, against those who did not rationalise their 
decisions, compare under fMRI during these evaluations. 
Conclusion 
In this study, we sought to detect the implicit beliefs of participants towards the 
fairness of the law that they followed, in this case Islamic law. Eight participants who 
had not studied the Maqasid spirit of law school and who were only familiar with a 
school of law that places an emphasis on the religious texts above that of a determination 
of fairness and purpose, appeared to exhibit a conlict between what they implicitly 
believed and what they claimed to believe. It may be that this conlict arose because 
their epistemology of law did not coincide with a theorised innate sense of fairness 
and teleological reasoning. If aspects of their law were perceived as unfair and lacking 
purpose, yet their legal school opposed considerations of these perceptions, then a form 
of dissonance, between explicit and implicit beliefs as found in the paper, may have 
been the outcome. Further, a person with such may have had to seek alternate ways to 
ameliorate this inconsistency. This may have taken the trajectory observed with those 
participants in this study who diferentiated between that which is rational and that 
which is fair. Indeed a more literalist approach to law can be less concerned with the 
outcome than loyalty to the meaning of the texts used in law. The study of the cognition 
of law may ofer us new perspectives on legal perceptions, especially those that seek to 
make fair judgment, be it through social contracts or non formalised legal systems.
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